El inhumano Derecho Penal de una funesta concepción de los Derechos Humanos

Abstract

I want to present to the international forum a few points of view that, in themselves, do not intended to be an euphemistic ethical, juridical defense, nor philosophical of the serious events that will mean the angular stone of the analysis that, with later inductive effects, will to be an object of this quodlibetum. On the contrary, it will be from them that —as will be verified further on pushing the limits of the theory itself, I want to test the internal and external coherence of the theoretical system of the so called human rights that it proclaims and apologiza the existence of a particular and special set of rights of those who are preached to be connaturales to the human being, as well as also —for logical consequence of such a hypothesis— of the doctrinaire and normative paragraph that refers to his claimed application erga omnes, in any space and, now also, in all time2. I am afraid, however, that the result of this examination will be negative because —advancing something of my judgment in this point— suspect that such a coherence still has not managed to be reached provided that it has not been developed in the fullness that we would have expected to obtain at this point of the history, what, for double, sympathetic misfortune as result to the own [juridical-political] system of material defense that supposedly should guard and protect the above-mentioned human rights.